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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Sixth Amendment * Televising Trials
Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981)
T HE SUPREME COURT recently handed down a unanimous decision deal-
ing with the respective rights of the press and defendants in regard to
the televising of criminal trials. The case, Chandler v. Florida,' while ex-
plicitly stated to be consistent' with the Court's earlier decision in Estes v.
Texas,' has expanded the realm of media coverage of criminal trials beyond
what apparently was permissible under Estes. The Court attempted to bal-
ance the competing constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
the sixth amendmen right to a fair trial. It held that while the presence
of television cameras in the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial, the de-
fendant must be allowed an opportunity to show that the presence of
television cameras actually prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
Appellants Chandler and Granger, were charged with conspiracy to
commit burglary, grand larceny, and possession of burglary tools in con-
nection with breaking and entering into a well known Miami Beach
restaurant. Normally, a crime of this nature would not be expected to
generate a great deal of media interest, but Chandler and Granger were
employees of the Miami Police Department at the time they committed
the crime. Of further interest was the fact that the sole reason appellants
were apprehended was that iheir radio conversations during the burglary
were fortuitously overheard by a local "ham" radio operator.'
By the time Chandler and Granger had reached the pretrial stage
of their proceedings, the Supreme Court of Florida had adopted what
was at that time Experimental Canon 3A(7) of the Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct, which in essence permitted the televising of judicial
proceedings despite the objections of the involved parties.' Appellants
1 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981). The vote of the Court was actually 8-0 with Justice Stevens
taking no part in the decision. Chief Justice Warren Burger authored the opinion.
2 Id. at 809, n. 8. The majority responds to Justice Stewart's insistence that Estes should
be overruled by stating. "There is no need to 'overrule' a 'holding' never made by the Court."
Id.
a381 U.S. 532 (1964).
4 As applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause.
5 101 S. Ct. at 806.
6 101 S. Ct. at 804-05. The initial provisions regarding the televising of trials were adopted
in Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 327 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1976), and re-
quired the consent of all parties involved before telecasting of proceedings was allowed.
However, it soon became apparent that the consent of both parties could rarely be simul-
taneously obtained. Thereafter, the consent requirement was abandoned in Petition of
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 347 So.2d-402 (Fla. 1976).
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argued via a pretrial motion that Experimental Canon 3A(7) was un-
constitutional both on its face and as applied. The question was certified
to the Florida Supreme Court which refused to rule on it based upon a
lack of relevance to the charges against Chandler and Granger.7
Despite appellant's objection to televised coverage of their trial, the
lower court permitted cameras to be present during all phases of the pro-
ceedings. At the conclusion of the case, only two minutes and fifty-five
seconds of the trial were aired on television, with all of this coverage being
devoted to presentation of the prosecution's case.' Chandler and Granger
were convicted by the jury on all counts and were later sentenced to
seven years in prison followed by nine years probation.9
The decision of the trial court was taken to the Florida District Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the lower tribunal. The District Court was
of the opinion that appellants had suffered no harm because of the presence
of television cameras at their trial. However, they did decide that the
question as to the "facial" constitutionality of Experimental Canon 3A(7)
was one of great public interest and thus certified that portion of the
decision to the Florida Supreme Court. Once again review was denied,
this time on the ground that the question was moot because of its decision
in Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc.,"° which made
Experimental Canon 3A(7) permanent."
In appealing their convictions to the United States Supreme Court,
petitioners argued that the presence of cameras in the courtroom
during a criminal trial is inherently prejudicial, basing this contention on
the court's previous decision in Estes. " Estes involved the prosecution for
swindling of a locally well known financier whose case had received a great
deal of publicity. At that time, Texas was one of only two states which
I State v. Granger, 352 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1977).
8 101 S. Ct. at 806.
9 Brief in Support of Jurisdiction at 11.
20 370 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
"I The Florida Supreme Court was of the opinion that broadcasting of trials would in-
crease public acceptance, awareness and confidence in the judicial process. The new Canon
3A(7) provides:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the conduct
of the proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and(iii) ensure fair administration of justice in the pending case, electronic media and
still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and trial
courts of this state shall be allowed in accordance with standards of conduct and
technology promulgated by the Supreme Court in Florida.
370 So.2d at 781.
t2 Brief for Appellants at 25.
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permitted telecasting of court proceedings.13 During the pre-trial of the
proceedings there were as many as twelve cameramen in the courtroom, but
live telecasting of the actual trial was prohibited during most of the trial.
Also, the cameramen were placed in a specially constructed booth at
the back of the courtroom which was designed to blend in with the re-
mainder of the surroundings." Although no one opinion commanded a
majority of the Court, Estes' conviction was set aside on the grounds
that he had been deprived of the due process of law to which he was
entitled under the fourteenth amendment. Four members of the Court were
of the opinion that the presence of television cameras in the court made
it impossible for defendants in criminal prosecutions to obtain a fair trial, and
thus held that no actual prejudice need be shown as the situation was in-
herently prejudicial." Four other Justices rejected this per se rule, and
further stated that petitioner had failed to show any actual prejudice.16
The deciding vote was cast by Justice Harlan, who felt that on these par-
ticular facts Estes had been deprived of due process of law. However,
he refused to join the four Justices who insisted that the telecasting of
criminal trials was inherently prejudicial to defendants. 7
In dealing with petitioner's claim that Estes announced a per se
constitutional prohibition against cameras in the courtroom, the Court
in Chandler relied heavily on the opinion of Justice Harlan. Concluding that
Justice Harlan had decided Estes solely on its facts, the Court held Estes
not to be an absolute bar to telecasting criminal trials.' Having reached
that conclusion, the Court then confronted the issue of whether the prac-
tice of allowing telecasting over a defendant's objection was in fact un-
constitutional. After discussing the benefits and detriments associated with
'3 381 U.S. at 535, citing STATE BAR OF TExAs CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETcs No. 28, 27
Tex. B.J. 102 (1964). The decision as to whether telecasting would be allowed was left to
the discretion of the trial judge. Like the Florida Canon dealt with in Chandler, the pro-
ceedings could be broadcast despite the objections of the defendant.
14381 U.S. at 536-37 (1964).
25The four members of the Court were Justice Clark, who authored the first opinion, and
Chief Justice Warren, who wrote a lengthy thirty-four page separate opinion which was
concurred in by Justices Douglas and Goldberg. The separate opinion of Chief Justice
Warren also contains various photographs of the courtroom during both the pretrial pro-
ceedings, at which petitioner Estes attempted to have television coverage excluded, and the
trial itself. 381 U.S. immediately following 586.
16 Dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Black, Brennan, and White.
381 U.S. at 601. Justice White also authored a separate dissent, joined by Justice Brennan.
Id. at 615. Justice Brennan also wrote separately. Id. at 617.
IT 381 U.S. at 587.
8 The majority based this conclusion on statements by Justice Harlan in Estes to the effect
that "at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the considerations against
allowing television- in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing factors advanced
in its support as to require holding that what was done in this case infringed upon the
fundamental right to a fair trial." 101 S. Ct. at 808 (emphasis added) citing Estes, 381
U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the televising of criminal trials, the Court concluded that the Florida
procedure did not, on its face, deprive defendants of their right to due
process of law. The Court further held that appellants had failed to
carry their burden of showing actual prejudice. Justices Stewart and
White, who concurred in the result reached by the majority, felt that the
decision could not be reached without specifically overruling Estes. Before
analyzing the scope and future ramifications of Chandler, it is important
to understand the initial reluctance of the judicial system to permit media
coverage of its proceedings."9
From the outset, opponents of media coverage of criminal trials
pointed to the trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann as a prime example of
potential for abuse inherent in. media coverage of nortorious criminal
trials. Hauptmann had been charged with the kidnapping of the Lindburgh
child.20 At the time of his trial, community sentiment was leaning heavily
against Hauptmann. There are reports of instances where observers of
the trial would applaud and cheer testimony detrimental to Hauptmann,
and occasions where those who testified as to his innocence were resoundly
booed." A large part of the frenzy surrounding this particular trial was
attributable to the tremendous amount of media coverage it had received.
In response to what many in judicial circles viewed as the primative cir-
cumstances under which the Hauptmann trial was conducted, the American
Bar Association House of Delegates adopted Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics prohibiting the taking of photographs during court sessions. 2
Due to the rise of television, Canon 35 was amended in 1952, to pro-
hibit the taking of motion pictures in the court room. 3 In 1972, the Code
of Judicial Conduct replaced the old Canons, but the substance of Canon
35 was retained in new Canon 3A(7)." In the meantime, however, a
number of states had begun to reject the underlying premise of these
Canons and were permitting,.in one form or another, telecasting of criminal
19 See generally Chandler, 101 S. Ct. at 803; Estes, 381 U.S. at 596.20 State v.. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649
(1935).
21 115 N.J.L. at 443-44, 180 A. at 827.
22 ABA CANONS OF JUDIcuL ETmcs No. 35 originally provided:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking
of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recess between sessions,
and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential
dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and creat misconceptions with respect
thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
101 S. Ct. at 804, n. 1 citing. 62 ABA Rip. 1134-35 (1937). It is interesting to note that there
is no reference to the. protection of a-criminal ddendant's interest in a fair trial.
2a 101 S. Ct. at 804 citing 77 ABA REP.-.610-11 (1952).
24 E. I T1ODB, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JuDIIcAL CONucT 56-59 (1973).
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trials within their jurisdictions."' At present, there are 28 jurisdictions
which permit television coverage of criminal trials,2" although telecasting
is still prohibited in the federal court system.27 It is against this somewhat
checkered backdrop that the decision in Chandler was evaluated by the
Court and must be viewed by those attempting to understand it.
While Chandler may seem at first glimpse to paint with a very broad
brush, on closer examination it is clear that the holding is actually a
limited one.20 Even though the majority opinion engages in discussion con-
cerning the effect of telecasting criminal trials on the judicial system, there
are four factors which indicate that the Chandler case may someday go
the route of its predecessor Estes and be limited to its particular facts.
The first factor which serves to narrow the apparent broad scope of
the holding is the concept of federalism. It would seem that the Court
wished to make clear that it would defer to the judgment of the states
on this question. The Court begins and ends its analysis of the case by
stating that it possesses no supervisory power over state courts and is
thus limited in terms of the scope of review.29 The concept of federalism
is further bolstered by statements such as "the states must be free to ex-
periment""0 and a quote from Justice Brandeis on the value of states as
"laboratories" for social experiments.' Further evidence of a deference
to states rights is found in Chief Justice Burger's statement subsequent to
Chandler that "the central point of that decision [Chandler] is the recogni-
tion that the United States Supreme Court is not a supervisor of state
courts. Our jurisdiction begins only when some action transgresses the
Constitution."" As previously noted, telecasting is not permitted in criminal
25 Television coverage of criminal trials was reported as early as 1953 in Oklahoma and 1955
in Texas. Lawton, The Retreat of Canon 35 . . . Some Places, in FREE AND FAIR, COURT-
ROOM ACCESS AND TtiE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 40, 41 (J. Kittros & K. Harwood ed. 1970). The
premise of Canon 35 was explicitly rejected by Chief Justice Moore of the Colorado
Supreme Court in In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
2
6Winter, Cameras in the Courtroom, 67 ABA J. 277 (1981). Ohio S. Ct. R. 11 provides
for telecasting of criminal trials. Also, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently held that the
Codes and Canons which permit such televising are mandatory in nature, not discretionary.
State ex rel. Grinnell Communications Corp. v. Love, 62 Ohio St. 2d 399, 406 N.E.2d 809
(1979).
27 Fed. R. Crim. P. 53.
28 The Court itself framed the issue in quite narrow terms: "Hence, we have before us
only the limited question of the Florida Supreme Court's authority to promulgate the
canon for the trial of cases in Florida courts," 101 S. Ct. at 807.
Lo Id. at 807, 814.
o Id. at 813.
8 lId. at 812 quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
32 Address to the Conference of Chief Justices (quoted in Winter, supra note 26 at 277).
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trials arising in a federal court.3" However, if this rule were to be changed
at some point in the future to provide for the contrary, it is quite possible
that the Supreme Court would not hesitate to use its supervisory powers
to void such a rule in the federal system.
The second aspect of Chandler which is important concerns the
procedures used by Florida in allowing cameras to broadcast criminal
proceedings. It is apparent upon careful examination that the Florida
system was designed to ensure criminal defendants the maximum amount
of protection available." First of all, the decision of whether and under
what circumstances cameras will be permitted is left at all times to the
discretion of the trial judge. 5 Secondly, there are numerous restrictions
placed upon telecasting procedures once the decision to allow cameras
in the courtroom has been made: only one camera and technician are
allowed; the telecasting team must use the court's existing recording
systems; there can be no artificial lighting; equipment cannot be moved
during the trial, nor can lenses be changed; no conversations between
lawyers, parties and their counsel, or bench conversations may be recorded;
and the judge may exclude coverage of certain witnesses or phases of
the trial at his discretion. In this manner Florida has attempted to deal
with many of the aspects which opponents of televised criminal trials
find objectionable."7
A third aspect of the decision which serves to restrict its future ap-
plication concerns the effect that televising a criminal trial has on the
participants." Petitioners had argued that the presence of television cam-
eras was, at least in criminal trials, inherently prejudicial to defendants in
that it caused jurors to suppress their personal beliefs and instead conform
to generally accepted ideas. 9 The effect of television on jurors, as well as
on others present in the courtroom, has been the subject of vigorous debate.4 0
The Supreme Court, however, stated that there was insufficient data to
3 Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34 Indeed, petitioners here did not argue that they were in fact actually prejudiced. As can
be seen upon a reading of their brief, appellant's main argument centered around the idea
that the procedure was inherently prejudicial. Brief of Appellants at 25.
35 Supra note 11.
a6 101 S. Ct. at 805.
37 Id. at 811.
i8 For a recent Ohio statistical survey evaluating the effect of televised trials, see Day, The
Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 Judges J. 18 (1981).
39 Brief for Appellants at 28.
,
0 See Joint Amicus Briefs of the Attorneys General of 17 states (including Ohio) and
the Conference of Chief Justices, which supported the Florida program. Opposing the
Florida program were the American Bar Association, American College of Trial Lawyers,
and numerous public defender agencies. 101 St. Ct. at 810, nn. 9 & 10.
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support the argument that the mere presence of cameras had a negative
psychological impact on jurors or any other participants in the trial."1
Another factor relevant to this determination was the finding that tech-
nological advances since the date of the Estes trial in 1962, have made
the presence of television in the courtroom less physically objectionable.
A fourth factor which is important to note concerns the ability of a
criminal defendant to show that the media coverage of his trial has in
some way prejudiced his case. The Court recognized that a showing of
prejudice may be made in regard to a judge or a trial participant, "' but
did not enumerate what factors were relevant to such a showing. However,
the majority did say that juror prejudice may be shown by offering proof
that "the presence of cameras impaired the ability of the jurors to decide
the case on only the evidence before them."4 3 In light of the fact that the
Estes decision is explicitly not overruled, it is also possible that a criminal
defendant may wish to show that coverage of his trial has been "sensa-
tional"" or that coverage should not be permitted at all because his trial
is a "notorious" '  one.
CONCLUSION
While Chandler does permit the telecasting of criminal trials despite
the objection of the defendant, one must be careful in evaluating what the
Court has actually said. Viewed in its narrowest terms, the decision merely
recognized the ability of state courts to determine for themselves whether
telecasting of criminal trials is a worthwhile proposition. Further, any
system which does not provide the same minimum procedural protections
for defendants as those found in the Florida program could be subject to
challenge. Also, defendants can always attempt to show actual prejudice or
41 id. at 812.
- Id. at 813.
'3 Id.
44 The term "sensational" was used by the Supreme Court to describe the type of media
coverage which surrounded the proceedings against Dr. Sam Sheppard. Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 356 (1965). The Court in Sheppard held that media coverage of that
type amounted to a deprivation of due process of law despite a lack of a showing of actual
prejudice. The Court also indicated what steps should have been taken to protect the de-
fendant's due process rights. Id. at 358-62. It should be noted, however, that Sheppard did
not discuss televising criminal trials.
45 "Notorious" was the adjective used by Justice Harlan in Estes when he characterized
the nature of the proceedings against the defendant.
My conclusion is that there is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed
in the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the
considerations against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the
countervailing factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was
done in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
381 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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present empirical evidence to prove that the televising of criminal trials
is, in fact, inherently prejudicial. It is thus clear that while the Supreme
Court has left the courtroom door open to television cameras in state court
proceedings, a change in any one of a number of circumstances could
abruptly shut that door.
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